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COMMENT
A FIRST EPISODE STANDARD FOR
INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT
ADAM G. GERHARDSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
When I was 21, my senior year of college was interrupted by a
psychotic manic episode—my first and so far only manic episode while
living with bipolar disorder. Like many people experiencing mania or psy-
chosis for the first time, it had its way with me. Every aspect of my life was
detrimentally affected by my episode—my relationships, education, and fi-
nancial assets. But as my life imploded around me, I saw nothing wrong
with my behavior or me. Everything made sense to my manic mind, but it
did not make sense to others, no matter how much energy and passion I put
into my explanations.
My manic episode came to an abrupt halt after I was involuntarily
hospitalized and slammed onto a stark hospital bed, secured in four-point
restraints. The silent room muffled my roars, and the restraints withstood
my violent struggle against them. Hospital staff patiently but firmly chal-
lenged my scornful resolve until I kept the pills in my mouth and swal-
lowed. Medicated and restrained, I fell asleep for the first time in 144 hours
(six full days and nights). Twenty-four hours later, I woke up in a semi-
conscious state and began the lifelong journey of living with a mental
illness.
For a long time, being strapped to that bed was the most traumatic
experience of my life. But time has a way of rewriting history. With eight
years of perspective, that trauma has morphed into gratitude. Without that
intervention, I may have never been able to accomplish what I have since—
regain my health, build a successful career, marry a woman of gold, and
make the dean’s list in law school. Now, when I look back on my hospitali-
* Juris Doctor, University of St. Thomas School of Law, 2013. Acknowledgements: This
article grew out of a conversation with Mindy Greiling. It was nurtured by the insights and support
of George V. Babolia, Dr. S. Charles Schulz, Judge Jay M. Quam, Eric S. Janus, Julie Oseid,
Valerie Aggerbeck, as well as my parents, Mimi Gingold and Al Gerhardstein, and my wife,
Meredith S. Hicks. Contact: adam.gerhardstein@gmail.com.
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zation, I am only haunted by what happened before I was involuntarily
hospitalized.
My parents, sister, and girlfriend pled with me to go to the hospital,
but I would not budge from my apartment. I was extremely manic, having
not slept for four days and four nights. My family called the police, but
when the police officers arrived at my apartment they knew little about
mental illness and had no reason to think I was dangerous, so they left. In
Ohio, and everywhere else in the United States, if a mentally ill person
poses no risk of physical harm, then the state will not intervene. Soon after
the police left, in a manic rage, I hit my mother in the face.
I still remember the sudden thud of my manic hand against her pan-
icked face. That memory will forever haunt me.
I have since learned that becoming violent—hitting my mom—gave
me a sure-fire ticket to treatment. I was dangerous. In every state in the
nation, I met the standard for involuntary hospitalization. After my parents
begged, bribed, and wrestled me to the hospital door, I was admitted and I
got treatment. My life depended on that treatment and hitting my mom en-
sured that I got it.
My experience is not unique. Many parents, in the midst of their
child’s first episode, have taken blows, or worse, before they could get their
child treatment.
This paper proposes a new standard for involuntary treatment,1 one
that does not include a requirement of physical harm. Instead, I am propos-
ing a standard that allows for involuntary treatment when an individual is
experiencing their first major episode2 of a psychiatric disorder. Specifi-
cally, the first-episode standard would allow for the involuntary treatment
of individuals who are (1) over 18; (2) mentally ill (the presence of a mental
disorder that diminishes a person’s ability to reason, resulting in an impair-
ment of functioning3); and (3) have never received psychiatric treatment for
the disorder.
The first-episode standard would have three major benefits. First, it
would soften the trauma of a first episode, assisting families in their at-
1. “Involuntary treatment” is the term I use to encompass both involuntary commitment to
an inpatient facility and court-ordered outpatient treatments.
2. “First episode” is the term I use to describe the initial manifestation of a mental illness;
for example, bipolar disorder would first manifest through a manic or hypomanic episode, and
schizophrenia through a psychotic episode. The most common age-of-onset for mental disorders is
during an individual’s teenage years or her twenties. Ronald C. Kessler et al., Lifetime Prevalence
and Age-of-Onset Distributions of DSM-IV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Repli-
cation (NCSR), 62 GEN. PSYCHIATRY 593, 595 (2005).
3. The definition of “mental illness” in the involuntary treatment statutes of all fifty states
contains those three basic elements: (1) the presence of a mental disorder that (2) diminishes a
person’s ability to reason, (3) resulting in an impairment of functioning. For statutory definitions
from all fifty states and the District of Columbia, see BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL, 75–78 (Carolina Academic Press, 2005).
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tempts to intervene before their loved ones’ lives are in complete disarray
and their episode escalates to the point of violence. Second, it would ex-
pand access to early, effective treatment, giving an individual experiencing
their first major episode the best chance for a healthy long-term prognosis.
Finally, it would reduce the number of future hospitalizations, the most ex-
pensive form of psychiatric treatment, consequently reducing the health
care costs paid by government programs, which pay for the majority of
psychiatric hospitalizations nationwide.
Psychiatry has identified first episodes as a major turning point in the
lives of individuals with mental illnesses. A first episode marks the onset of
a major psychiatric disorder. A first manic or depressive episode leads to a
diagnosis of bipolar disorder or depression, and a first psychotic episode
usually leads to a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Psychiatric literature is satu-
rated with studies concerning first episodes.4 Advocacy groups for the men-
tally ill and their families conduct surveys about their experiences during
first episodes.5 Hospitals set up psychiatric treatment programs to specifi-
cally treat first episodes.6 Books have been written to help patients and their
families deal with first episodes.7 Despite these advances in other areas, the
law and legal literature is nearly devoid of references to first episodes. In
fact, after searching through hundreds of law review articles, statutes, and
legal books, I have only seen first episodes discussed in one article8 and one
book,9 both written by one legal scholar: Ms. Elyn R. Saks.
Like me, Saks has a mental illness and has received involuntary treat-
ment.10 She is currently a renowned legal scholar at the University of
Southern California Gould School of Law specializing in mental health law.
4. See, e.g., Katherine N. Thompson, Patrick D. McGorry & Susan M. Harrigan, Reduced
Awareness of Illness in First-Episode Psychosis, 42 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 6, 498–503
(2001); see also Mauricio Tohen et al., Baseline Characteristics and Outcomes in Patients With
First Episode or Multiple Episodes of Acute Mania, 71 J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 3, 255–61 (2010).
5. See, e.g., NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, FIRST EPISODE: PSYCHOSIS: RE-
SULTS FROM A 2011 NAMI SURVEY (2011) [hereinafter NAMI, FIRST EPISODE], available at http:/
/www.nami.org/FirstEpisode/firstepisodesurvey.pdf.
6. See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA MEDICAL CENTER, FAIRVIEW, FIRST EPISODE PSY-
CHOSIS PROGRAM, www.uofmmedicalcenter.org/Specialties/Behavioralhealth/First-EpisodeP-
sychosis/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2012).
7. See MICHAEL T. COMPTON & BETH BROUSSARD, THE FIRST PSYCHOSIS: A GUIDE FOR
PATIENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES (2009).
8. See Elyn R. Saks, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 94
(2003).
9. See ELYN R. SAKS, REFUSING CARE: FORCED TREATMENT AND THE RIGHTS OF THE MEN-
TALLY ILL (2002).
10. After becoming a leading legal scholar, Saks published a memoir, The Center Cannot
Hold: My Journey Through Madness, discussing her journey with schizophrenia. She struggled
with the decision whether to expose her illness, but the memoir was warmly received, and it
earned her a $500,000 McArthur Foundation “genius” award, which she used to create the Saks
Institute for Mental Health Law, Policy, and Ethics. See Benedict Carey, Memoir About Schizo-
phrenia Spurs Others to Come Forward, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2011), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/10/23/health/23livesside.html.
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Buried in the middle of her book, Refusing Care, is a discussion of a stan-
dard allowing hospitalization on the first episode, regardless of whether the
individual poses a threat of physical harm.11 In a later article, she proposes
a closely related “one-shot rule” to allow one course of involuntary outpa-
tient treatment for individuals after multiple hospitalizations.12 Her propos-
als are both premised on Alan Stone’s “thank you” theory of civil
commitment, which proposes “that without treatment the patient will deteri-
orate and, never having realized the benefits of treatment, will never appre-
ciate that he would really like it.”13 Her proposals would allow individuals
to get inpatient involuntary treatment during their initial mental health cri-
ses, and if they later become non-compliant with treatment, to get one
course of involuntary outpatient treatment to experience living in the com-
munity while being treated. Saks’s work was published in 2002 and 2003,
but failed to trigger a larger discussion. In fact, I could not find a single
notable scholarly response, and when I spoke with Saks, she was also una-
ware of any response to her work.14
Saks’s work theorizes why early intervention is warranted during a
first episode. My Comment differs significantly in style and substance. I
largely avoid the theoretical reasons for adopting a first-episode standard,
focusing instead on the individual, social, medical, and political reasons.
Most notably, I discuss a first-episode standard in practice—its language
and application within the current mental health landscape. However, our
work is complimentary, and given the paucity of legal discussion of this
topic, would be most valuable if read in tandem.
Section I of this Comment briefly discusses the medical, legal, and
systemic changes in the mental health field over the last fifty years. Section
II discusses the unique characteristics of a first episode. Section III is the
11. SAKS, supra note 9, at 56–68.
12. Saks, supra note 8, at 95.
13. SAKS, supra note 9, at 59; see also Saks, supra note 8, at 100.
14. Saks’s proposal is so buried in the dominant debate that I only discovered it near the end
of writing my first draft. As a result, I developed my own language describing our shared idea,
and this article is not written as a response to her work or as an expansion upon it. Once I discov-
ered her work, I called her on July 30, 2012, and she verified that as far as she knew her proposal
had never sparked a larger discussion. The idea of a first episode standard came to me from Mindy
Greiling, a Minnesota State Representative, who has worked to reform involuntary treatment laws
since her son had his first psychotic episode in 1999. When I met with her on June 21, 2012, she
knew of no one who had seriously discussed a first episode standard. Over the next three weeks, to
further develop the idea, I spoke with professionals involved in almost every stage of the involun-
tary treatment process: George V. Babolia, the Director of Social Work Services at the University
of St. Thomas Interprofessional Center and a clinical social worker who does assessments in a
Minnesota emergency room for involuntary hospitalizations; Dr. S. Charles Schulz, Psychiatrist
and Head of the University of Minnesota’s Department of Psychiatry; Judge Jay M. Quam, Min-
nesota District Court Presiding Judge of Hennepin County’s Mental Health Court; Eric S. Janus,
former Managing Attorney of Minneapolis Legal Aid Society and currently Dean of William
Mitchell School of Law specializing in civil commitment scholarship. Their insights were
invaluable.
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most important section as it defines the first-episode standard, and discusses
how it could be integrated into most states’ involuntary treatment delivery
systems. Section IV addresses some therapeutic and legal concerns that may
be raised by the first-episode standard. The conclusion calls for further dis-
cussion and, ultimately, the adoption of the first-episode standard.
I. INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT STANDARDS ARE CHANGING
  The seismic shifts in mental health and involuntary treatment of the last
fifty years were never clearer to me than when Minnesota State Representa-
tive Mindy Greiling told me her personal story.15 When Mindy was in fifth
grade, in 1958, her grandmother was sent to Minnesota’s Rochester State
Hospital to be treated for schizophrenia. To this day, Mindy remembers
dreaming of getting her grandmother out of that asylum. Forty-one years
later, in 1999, Mindy’s son had his first psychotic episode and she struggled
to get him involuntarily committed. Instead of dreaming about getting a
loved one out of a hospital, Mindy found herself fighting to get a loved one
in. Having recently been elected to the state legislature, Mindy returned to
her post, organized her colleagues, and effected a change in Minnesota’s
legal standards for involuntary treatment to hopefully make it easier for
mentally ill individuals to get effective treatment.16
Medical, legal, and systemic treatment of mental illness has shifted
dramatically over the last fifty years. Advances in medication and psycho-
therapy have allowed more and more people with mental disorders to live
their lives relatively symptom-free and without dramatic side effects.17 The
state-run mental hospitals of the 1950s and 60s have been largely emptied,
dispersing many people into the community, re-institutionalizing many
15. Conversation with Mindy Greiling on June 21, 2012 (her story is shared here with her
permission).
16. Greiling and her colleagues amended MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 in the first special session
of 2001 as follows:
Subd. 13.  [MENTALLY ILL PERSON.] (a) “Mentally ill person” means any person
who has an organic disorder of the brain or a substantial psychiatric disorder of thought,
mood, perception, orientation, or memory which grossly impairs judgment, behavior,
capacity to recognize reality, or to reason or understand, which is manifested by in-
stances of grossly disturbed behavior or faulty perceptions and poses a substantial likeli-
hood of physical harm to self or others as demonstrated by:
(1) a failure to obtain necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care as a result of the
impairment;
(2) an inability for reasons other than indigence to obtain necessary food, clothing, shel-
ter, or medical care as a result of the impairment and it is more probable than not that
the person will suffer substantial harm, significant psychiatric deterioration or debilita-
tion, or serious illness, unless appropriate treatment and services are provided;
(3) a recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or others; or
(4) recent and volitional conduct involving significant to substantial property.
Act effective July 1, 2002, 2001 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1st Sp. Sess. Ch. 9 (S.F. 4). Available in
this form at: https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/laws/?doctype=Chapter&year=2001&type=1&
id=9 (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
17. RICHARD G. FRANK & SHERRY A. GLIED, BETTER NOT WELL: MENTAL HEALTH POLICY
IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1950, 26–47 (2006).
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others in nursing homes and prisons, and leaving some homeless.18 Coin-
ciding with this shift was the rise of health insurance programs, particularly
Medicare and Medicaid. These two factors shifted the entire mental health
system from “a centralized planned activity run by the states to a pluralistic,
market-oriented system of care.”19 This shift has not gone without criticism:
The consequence has been to exchange a set of bureaucratic fail-
ures and tight budgets that took responsibility for all care for a
circumscribed population for a vastly richer, decentralized system
of care that suffers from market failure and allows some people
with significant impairments to fall through the cracks.20
Among the forces driving these changes was a slew of class-action
litigation resulting in a number of Supreme Court decisions regarding the
civil commitment of people with mental illness.21 Responding to egregious
cases of institutional abuse and mismanagement, the Court addressed due
process protections for individuals involuntarily confined in mental health
facilities,22 the nature and duration of civil commitments,23 the standard of
proof in civil commitment hearings,24 and the confinement of non-danger-
ous individuals with mental illness.25 As these decisions rippled through
state legislatures and treatment facilities, civil commitment shifted from a
medical model that allowed psychiatrists and physicians to “commit pa-
tients based upon an assessment of whether the best interests of the patient
required care and treatment in hospitals,” to a legal model “that specified
more restrictive standards for commitment and imposed procedural require-
ments for its involuntary application.”26
As part of this trend, the fifty states reformed their standards for invol-
untary treatment. Generally accepted legal theory provides that civil com-
mitment is justified by the government’s parens patriae and police
powers.27  Under its parens patriae powers, the state has a legitimate inter-
est in providing care to individuals who cannot care for themselves; under
its police powers, the state can protect the community from potential dan-
gers.28 Thus, the legal standards for civil commitment determine how
18. Id. at 1–5.
19. Id. at 69.
20. Id.
21. See Alison Pfeffer, Note, “Imminent Danger” and Inconsistency: The Need for National
Reform of the “Imminent Danger” Standard for Involuntary Civil Commitment in the Wake of the
Virginia Tech Tragedy, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 277, 283–89 (2008), for a concise overview of these
holdings.
22. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
23. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
24. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
25. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
26. WINICK, supra note 3, at 4.
27. 53 AM. JUR. 2d Mentally Impaired Persons § 7 (1996).
28. Eric S. Janus, Hendricks and the Moral Terrain of Police Power Civil Commitment, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 297, 303 (1998).
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broadly the courts will interpret inability to care for oneself and danger to
the community. In the wake of the class-action litigation of the 1970s, states
drew tighter boundaries around their parens patriae and police powers. In
many cases, this resulted in civil commitment standards requiring that a
person pose an imminent danger to themselves or others before they could
be involuntarily treated.29
Almost all states have now broadened their standards beyond immi-
nent danger.30 Currently, “most state involuntary civil commitment laws
regard a serious or substantial ‘risk’ or ‘likelihood’ of harm to self or others
as sufficient.”31 Other states have significantly broadened the application of
their parens patriae powers, allowing for involuntary treatment when indi-
viduals are “gravely disabled,” meaning they cannot care for their basic
needs, or when they have a need for medical treatment (not including psy-
chiatric treatment) and are not seeking it out.32 In still other states, individu-
als can be given involuntary treatment if they harm property.33 The one
thread that ties these various involuntary treatment standards together is that
they all require courts to justify involuntary treatment by the potential of
physical harm—whether that is bodily harm to another person, threats to the
medical health of the person with the mental illness, or harm to physical
property.
It is well known that mental illness can cause some individuals to seri-
ously neglect their own physical health or, more rarely, become violent to-
wards others.34 There is no doubt that intervention is appropriate in those
cases. But, even if an individual does not threaten any sort of physical
harm, her mental illness can still unravel her life and destroy her future,
especially if she does not see her illness coming. That is the problem a first-
episode standard—requiring a need for treatment and not a likelihood of
physical harm—could help address.
II. FIRST EPISODES OF MENTAL ILLNESS ARE LEGALLY RECOGNIZABLE
AND CRITICAL TO AN INDIVIDUAL’S PSYCHIATRIC PROGNOSIS
In this section, I will first argue that the law has an episodic view of
mental illness, giving it an inherent ability to recognize first episodes. Then,
I will argue that if the law were to recognize first episodes it could play an
29. The legal evolution of civil commitment standards is discussed more below in section
IV(B)(1), but an example of an “imminent danger” standard is still the law in Georgia, where a
person must “present a substantial risk of imminent harm to that person or others” to be civilly
committed. GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(9.1) (2010).
30. Pfeffer, supra note 21, at 289–93.
31. Id. at 289.
32. WINICK, supra note 3, at 99–100.
33. See MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 13 (2010).
34. The vast majority of individuals having psychotic episodes do not become violent in any
way. See Matthew M. Large & Olav Nielssen, Violence in First-Episode Psychosis: A Systemic
Review and Meta-Analysis, 125 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 214 (2011).
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important role in addressing the unique individual, social, medical, and po-
litical effects of first episodes.
A. The Law Already Has an Episodic View of Mental Illness
Today, in every state, a person must meet three general requirements
to be given involuntary mental health treatment: (1) an age requirement,
usually 18; (2) the person must be mentally ill; and (3) the person must be
causing harm or likely to cause harm to themselves, someone else, or prop-
erty.35 Of these three requirements, the third gets the most attention from
lawyers, scholars, physicians, legislators, and people personally affected by
involuntary treatment, but for the vast majority of people the first two re-
quirements are the most important. The age and mental illness requirements
create a proportionally tiny class of people who could even conceivably be
involuntarily committed—adults who are mentally ill. Minors are excluded
from this definition because even if they refuse mental health treatment they
can be “voluntarily” admitted to a psychiatric hospital by their parents or by
the state when the child is a state ward. This is because “[m]ost children,
even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concern-
ing many decisions, including their need for medical care or treatment. Par-
ents can and must make those judgments.”36 Of adults in the United States,
ninety-seven to ninety-nine percent will never qualify for involuntary treat-
ment because they will never fit the statutory definitions of people who are
mentally ill.37 Statutory definitions of mental illness are simple, yet
profound, and it is within them that I discovered something no legal scholar
has discussed before—the law’s episodic view of mental illness.
Statutory definitions of mental illness vary from state to state but the
core elements are always (1) the presence of a mental disorder that (2) di-
minishes a person’s ability to reason, (3) resulting in an impairment of func-
tioning.38 For example, in Ohio, where I was involuntarily hospitalized,
mental illness has a thirty-one word definition: “Mental illness means a
substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory
that grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or
ability to meet the ordinary demands of life.”39
35. For excerpts from all fifty state statutes, see TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, STATE
STANDARDS FOR ASSISTED TREATMENT: CIVIL COMMITMENT CRITERIA FOR INPATIENT OR OUTPA-
TIENT PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT, 1–85 (2011), available at www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/
storage/documents/Standards_-_The_Text-_June_2011.pdf.
36. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
37. Studies of prevalence of mental illness vary widely, but those that take into account
individuals’ functioning, which is one component of statutory definitions and considered to be a
differentiating element between mental illness and severe mental illness, indicate that somewhere
between 1% and 2.8% of the population could potentially fit statutory definitions of mental ill-
ness. FRANK & GLIED, supra note 17, at 20.
38. See WINICK, supra note 3, at 75–78, for statutory definitions from all fifty states and the
District of Columbia.
39. OHIO REV. CODE § 5122.01(A) (2012).
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In clinical settings, much greater attention is given to the definition
and description of mental illnesses. Clinicians—such as psychiatrists, psy-
chologists, counselors, therapists, or nurses—do not look to state statutes to
define and diagnose mental illness. Instead, they most commonly rely on
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) pub-
lished by the American Psychiatric Association.40 Its diagnoses are long
and nuanced. For example, in order to make a diagnosis of Bipolar I Disor-
der, a clinician must be able to make sense of almost 14,000 words describ-
ing the various behavioral phenomena that the clinician may be observing
from a patient.41 Bipolar I Disorder is only one of 297 disorders described
within the DSM-IV. Although legal definitions of mental illness are sub-
stantially shorter and less nuanced than clinical definitions, the law’s under-
standing of mental illness is actually quite insightful.
For clinical purposes, I have been mentally ill since I was hospitalized
in 2004. But according to Ohio law, 2004 was the last time I was mentally
ill—it was only during my manic episode that I met the statutory definition
of a person with a mental illness. This is why I say the law has an episodic
view of mental illness.
According to the DSM-IV, “Bipolar I Disorder is characterized by the
occurrence of one or more manic episodes or mixed episodes.”42 A manic
episode is a “distinct period of abnormally and persistently elevated, expan-
sive, or irritable mood, lasting at least one week (or any duration if hospital-
ization is necessary).”43 A selection of symptoms (such as grandiosity,
decreased need of sleep, pressured speech, or distractibility) must be ob-
served in order for this distinct period to be characterized as a manic epi-
sode.44 That distinct period of time—that episode—is the prerequisite for
being diagnosed with bipolar disorder, and that diagnosis is a prerequisite to
a lifetime of mental health treatment to prevent or extinguish future epi-
sodes. Clinically, I am always viewed as a person with a mental illness.
With that label, I gain access to the medications I need to stay healthy and
stay out of the hospital—at least when my psychiatrist is making his diag-
nosis based on the DSM-IV and not the Ohio Revised Code.
Like other states, the core components of Ohio’s definition of mental
illness are (1) the presence of a mental disorder that (2) diminishes a per-
son’s ability to reason, (3) resulting in an impairment of functioning.45 Even
40. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 2000). The fifth edition of the DSM was released in May 2013
during the revision phase of this article. Its changes to the portions discussed here were not ex-
pected to be significant.
41. See generally id. at ch. 6.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See WINICK, supra note 3, at 75–78, for statutory definitions from all fifty states and the
District of Columbia.
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if I have had a “mental disorder” since my diagnosis with bipolar disorder
in 2004, it has not since diminished my ability to reason or impaired my
functioning to the point where I would meet this statutory definition. As a
result, the law would not label me as a person with a mental illness.
Consequently, as I write this, I meet the psychiatric diagnostic criteria
for a person with a mental illness, but I do not meet the statutory criteria for
a person with a mental illness. This contradiction signals the different inter-
ests of psychiatry and the law.
With treatment, most people diagnosed with schizophrenia, bipolar
disorder, or major depression are not psychotic, manic, or depressed; they
are at work or at school living healthy lives like everyone else. Psychiatry is
concerned with these people, but the law is not. Psychiatrists and other cli-
nicians want to make sure these people stay healthy, so they monitor little
blips on the radar and make treatment adjustments as necessary. But occa-
sionally, things go wrong. Individuals with mental illness may not adhere to
their treatments or their illness is triggered by something they cannot con-
trol, and they have an episode. Episodes are the manifestations of severe
mental illnesses and they come in many different varieties that clinicians
have described thoroughly.46 Usually it is psychotic, manic, and major de-
pressive episodes that lead to involuntary treatment.
Psychosis, mania, and major depression are extreme mental states.
They are incomprehensible to those who have never experienced them or
witnessed someone else go through them. Most people who experience
these states of mind do not stay there long and try not to go back often.
These rare states of mind are both real and unusual. They should not be
glossed over or brushed aside. Any discussion of the standards for involun-
tary treatment must address the fact that such standards only apply to a
unique class of individuals who are momentarily unpredictable, irrational,
and yes, insane.
The law, whether it knows it or not, has an unbiased view of those
labeled elsewhere as mentally ill, a view that society as a whole should
perhaps aspire to. The law could care less what an individual has been la-
beled; it only becomes concerned when an individual’s illness flares up,
they lose their ability to reason, and their functioning becomes impaired. It
is episodes that interest the law. Yet the law has struggled to figure out what
to do during episodes. Currently, it segregates episodes based on whether
the individual’s behavior during that time poses some sort of physical dan-
ger. The problem is that not all people become dangerous during an epi-
46. For example, in the DSM-IV, of the roughly 14,000 words describing Bipolar I Disorder,
4,000 describe major depressive episodes, 2,500 describe manic episodes, 1,100 describe mixed
episodes, and 1,600 describe hypomanic episodes. And all of these episodes can come in varying
levels of severity and frequency. A person’s bipolar diagnosis tracks these episodes and changes
to reflect whatever the most recent episode was. So after a depressive episode, someone would be
bipolar I, most recent episode depressed.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\10-2\UST205.txt unknown Seq: 11  8-JAN-14 14:19
2012] FIRST EPISODE STANDARD FOR INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT 479
sode, but even when they do not, they almost always need some form of
help. This is especially true during their first episode—when they are stand-
ing in their apartments, yelling in their mothers’ faces that nothing is wrong
with them, and yet something so clearly is—even if it has yet to be
diagnosed.
B. There Are Unique Individual, Social, Medical, and Political Effects
of First Episodes that the Law Does Not Address
While the law does view mental illness episodically, it has failed to
draw a crucial distinction between episodes. An individual’s first psychotic,
manic, or severe depressive episode47 has a profound impact on their life,
their family, and society as a whole.
First episodes present unique individual and social challenges. When
first episodes strike, people with mental illness and their families do not
know where to turn or what they need. “The issues facing a first episode
client are different from those facing a chronically ill patient and his/her
relatives . . . they do not have prior experience with psychosis, the acuteness
of the episode is more mystifying and there is often diagnostic ambigu-
ity.”48 The National Alliance on Mental Illness conducted a survey of 1,215
people who had experienced psychosis and 2,882 people who had witnessed
someone in the early stages of psychosis, and when asked who was most
helpful to them during the early stages of psychosis, 22.2% of individuals
who experienced psychosis and 21% of their loved ones answered “no
one.”49 This was the greatest proportion among responses—suggesting a
high level of isolation and desperation.50 There are many resources about
mental illness available on the Internet and in the community, but people
47. Most involuntary treatment is for psychotic, manic, or severe depressive episodes. How-
ever, most of the literature that I cite only deals with psychotic and manic episodes. This is be-
cause most of the behavior that would warrant first episode involuntary treatment would stem
from mania or psychosis. Usually, depressive episodes only result in involuntary treatment when
an individual becomes suicidal, at which point they are a danger to themselves and there would be
no need for a first episode standard. Elyn R. Saks conceptualizes a first episode standard as apply-
ing to “First Psychotic Breaks,” SAKS, supra note 9, at 59. Most likely, people who would get
treatment under the first episode standard would be psychotic. However, defining the standard by
psychosis or limiting the standard to psychosis is impractical. Neither police officers in the field
nor judges in the courtroom are positioned to make clinical diagnosis. “Psychosis” is a clinical
term. It is only mentioned in legal definitions of mental illness in the District of Columbia and
New Jersey, which specifically says, “The term mental illness is not limited to ‘psychosis’ or
‘active psychosis.’” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.2(r) (West 2010). Using new language, especially
clinically loaded language could cause confusion among the many players who would work with
the standard, potentially making it unworkable. A simple solution is to re-conceptualize current
legal definitions of “mental illness” as “episodes.” Thus when I use the term “first episode” I am
referring to the first time someone could meet the statutory definition of mentally ill.
48. Jean Addington, April Collins, Amanda McCleery & Donald Addington, The Role of
Family Work in Early Psychosis, 79 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 77, 79 (2005).
49. NAMI, FIRST EPISODE, supra note 5, at 4.
50. Id.
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first experiencing it are in the midst of a crisis, have rarely—if ever—given
any thought to mental illness, and as a result, do not know where to look.
Furthermore, the individuals experiencing first episodes often have lit-
tle or no insight into their illness. More plainly stated, the people who are
psychotic or manic do not think anything is wrong with them. In the
Segarra study out of Spain, only 52.2% of people with schizophrenia and
49.4% with schizoaffective disorder showed good insight after they had
been initially admitted to an inpatient or outpatient psychiatric unit.51 You
would think that being admitted to a hospital would give an indication that
something is wrong, but this study suggests that for half of mentally ill
people—myself included—it does not.
Lack of insight is a problem if the goal is to stay healthy. Insight into
one’s illness is layered and comes with different consequences. For exam-
ple, some individuals may not believe they are mentally ill, but they do
believe that taking medication helps them to function in society.52 Even that
layer of insight can have profound impacts on their long-term prognosis.
Studies have shown that people with greater awareness of the benefits of
treatment have greater adherence to treatment and have shorter, less fre-
quent hospitalizations—which means shorter, less frequent major epi-
sodes.53 Most importantly, “insight is the biggest predictor of who will
refuse to take medicine.”54 What these studies show, and what common
sense confirms, is that people who believe they have a mental illness are
more likely to adhere to mental health treatment; as with other illnesses,
adhering to treatment makes it much more likely you will stay healthy.
The good news is that people who have low insight during their first
episode can develop insight over time. The Segarra study found that while
only 50% of the participants had strong insight at onset, around 82% of
them had good insight after a year of consistent treatment.55 However, a
few studies suggest that some people with serious mental illnesses may
never develop insight and that their lack of insight has a biological origin.56
Yet it is currently impossible to distinguish between individuals incapable
of developing insight and those who eventually will before they are in
treatment.
When serious mental illness goes untreated the consequences can be
disastrous, both for the individuals with mental illness and for their commu-
nities. Dr. E. Fuller Torrey has linked untreated mental illness to the mass
51. R. Segarra et al., Longitudinal Changes of Insight in First Episode Psychosis and its
Relation to Clincal Symptoms, Treatment Adherence and Global Functioning: One-year Follow-
up from the Eiffel Study, 27 EUR. PSYCHIATRY 43, 44–47 (2012).
52. See XAVIER AMADOR, I AM NOT SICK, I DON’T NEED HELP!: HOW TO HELP SOMEONE
WITH MENTAL ILLNESS ACCEPT TREATMENT 16 (2nd ed. 2007).
53. See id. at 17.
54. Id.
55. See Segarra, supra note 51, at 47.
56. See AMADOR, supra note 52, at 21–36, for a discussion of anosognosia.
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incarceration and homelessness of people with serious mental illness, citing
studies which report “that 40 percent of individuals with serious mental
illnesses have been in jail or prison at some time in their lives.”57 In addi-
tion, one-third of homeless men and two-thirds of homeless women have
serious psychiatric disorders.58 In addition to these alarming statistics, dur-
ing the last thirty years, Dr. Torrey has compiled a database of news stories
involving encounters between people with mental illness and the law—
most ending with the untreated person in prison or dead.59 Two universal
truths can be gleaned from these statistics: (1) episodes of mental illness
happen in public, not in the privacy of one’s mind; and (2) having a severe
episode can disrupt an individual’s life in the most dramatic ways possible.
Fortunately, not all episodes have such tragic consequences. Many
people can be psychotic or manic for some time without doing anything
criminal or winding up homeless. But during that time, life becomes diffi-
cult. The National Alliance on Mental Illness survey asked individuals who
had experienced a first psychotic episode to rate how difficult it was to
manage various aspects of their daily lives during their psychosis. The re-
spondents were asked to rate the aspects on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being
very difficult. The respondents “rated social life as very difficult (51.1 per-
cent) followed by work (47.5 percent), romantic relationships (47.4 per-
cent), friendships (42.6 percent), and relationships with parents (39.2
percent).”60 The same survey found that first episodes made family and
friends’ social lives, work, and romantic relationships more difficult as
well.61 Even when a first episode does not land an individual in prison or on
the streets, it often makes it very difficult for the afflicted and their loved
ones to manage the basic aspects of their everyday lives.
Fortunately, a first episode can be a last episode, or at least the last
major episode. With proper treatment and the development of insight, peo-
ple with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and depression can stay stable and
healthy indefinitely. This ideal outcome is not experienced by most, but it is
possible, and it should be the ultimate goal of treatment. Many steps must
be taken in achieving this goal—some are large interventions, others occa-
sional tweaks, and almost always daily doses. Long-term stability depends
on a large number of factors—treatment adherence, the severity and type of
57. E. Fuller Torrey et al., More Mentally Ill Persons Are in Jails and Prisons Than Hospi-
tals: A Survey of the States, 1 (2010), available at http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/
storage/documents/final_jails_v_hospitals_study.pdf.
58. See E. FULLER TORREY, THE INSANITY OFFENSE: HOW AMERICA’S FAILURE TO TREAT
THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL ENDANGERS ITS CITIZENS 124 (2008).
59. See TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, Preventable Tragedies Database, PREVENTABLE
TRAGEDIES, http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/problem/preventable-tragedies-database
(last visited Sept. 13, 2012) (using the “Advanced Search” box, check the option for “Person with
mental illness injured or killed in altercation with law enforcement,” and insert a date range for the
last thirty years in the “Date or Date Range” search box).
60. NAMI, FIRST EPISODE, supra note 5, at 9.
61. See id. at 3.
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the illness, social and familial support, quality and availability of care, and
the holistic health of the individual to name a few. But, no matter what, the
first step towards this ideal outcome is getting effective treatment early in
the onset of the first episode.
Research has shown that early and consistent treatment has a positive
effect on the long-term course of the illness.62 “[W]hen antipsychotic drugs
are given shortly after the illness first emerges, and subsequent psychotic
episodes are treated quickly to shorten their duration, future response to
treatment and prognosis is greatly improved.”63 Conversely, when there is a
longer period between when the episode begins and when the person begins
treatment, there is a greater chance that person will have more episodes.64
One study followed 276 seriously mentally ill young people over seven-
and-a-half years, and found that those who had less episodes and episodes
that were treated early in their onset were higher functioning and less ill
later in life.65 Unfortunately, there can be long delays between when an
individual first experiences symptoms and eventually receives treatment. In
one survey of 250 people living with schizophrenia, the average period of
time between onset and initial treatment was 8.5 years.66
A delay in treatment is problematic for those with mental illnesses.
Some researchers have suggested that when episodes go untreated they can
have severe consequences. These scholars claim that psychotic episodes
may be toxic to the brain, actually killing or altering brain cells.67 For de-
pression and mania, researchers have observed a “kindling effect,” as if
each additional episode is a twig that helps build a larger fire, and when it
dies down the coals still simmer and can flare up with little provocation.
This “kindling effect” may lead to more frequent and easily-triggered manic
or depressive episodes.68
Frequent, prolonged episodes not only negatively impact the people
who suffer them, they negatively impact every taxpayer. In 2001, total na-
tionwide spending on mental health services equaled $85.4 billion, of
which, federal and state government spent 63.1%, or $53.89 billion.69 The
most expensive way to provide mental health services is in an inpatient
setting. One day of inpatient treatment for bipolar disorder in a community-
62. See AMADOR, supra note 52, at 13.
63. Id. at 14.
64. See A.C. Altamura et al., Duration of Untreated Psychosis as a Predictor of Outcome in
First-Episode Schizophrenia: A Retrospective Study, 52 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 29, 32 (2001).
65. See AMADOR, supra note 52, at 14.
66. See NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, SCHIZOPHRENIA: PUBLIC ATTITUDES, PER-
SONAL NEEDS 4–5 (2008) [hereinafter NAMI, SCHIZOPHRENIA], available at www.nami.org/
sstemplate.cfm?sectionHIZOPHRENIASURVEY
67. See AMADOR, supra note 52, at 13.
68. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Kendler, Laura M. Thornton & Charles O. Gardner, Genetic Risk,
Number of Previous Depressive Episodes, and Stressful Life Events in Predicting Onset of Major
Depression, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 582 (2001).
69. See FRANK & GLIED, supra note 17, at 51.
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based hospital costs an average of $876 for privately insured patients and
$804 for patients on Medicaid.70 Comparatively, my outpatient mental
health expenses for last year cost $8.62 per day.71 In addition to hospital
costs, when a person with a mental illness has a major episode that leads to
civil commitment, the general public also covers much of the litigation
costs associated with that process.72
Psychotic, manic, and major depressive episodes are expensive. Cost
can seem trivial, however, when compared with other consequences, like
when episodes land people on the streets or in jail. Even if that fate is
avoided, episodes still make life very difficult for the individuals experienc-
ing them and their loved ones, especially first episodes. But first episodes
can be last episodes, and studies show that the best way to prevent multiple
episodes from happening—and the personal difficulties and public expenses
that accompany them—is to provide individuals mental health treatment
soon after their first episode emerges. That is what the first-episode stan-
dard would help facilitate.
III. A FIRST-EPISODE STANDARD FOR INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT
WOULD WORK
This paper proposes an alternative standard for involuntary treatment
that could be used when individuals pose no physical danger, but are exper-
iencing their first episode of a mental illness. It would use the state’s pre-
existing requirements for an individual’s age and symptoms of mental ill-
ness, but eliminate the physical harm requirements. This proposed standard
would encompass a small percentage of the general population—those who
meet the statutory definition of a person who is mentally ill, but have never
received mental health treatment for their condition. It is a narrow standard,
but it would help a discrete group of people and their families during an
unprecedented crisis point in their lives.
To meet the first-episode standard and qualify for involuntary treat-
ment, individuals must be (1) over 18, (2) mentally ill (the presence of a
mental disorder that diminishes a person’s ability to reason, resulting in an
70. Michael Stensland et al., An Examination of Costs, Charges, and Payments for Inpatient
Psychiatric Treatment in Community Hospitals, 63 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 666, 670 (2012).
71. The cost of my medications was $2,402.65 and the cost of my outpatient psychiatrist
visits was $744, which totals $3,146.65. My insurance paid $2,638.50 of these costs.
72. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 253B.23 subd.1(a) (2012) (“In each proceeding under this chap-
ter the court shall allow and order paid to each witness subpoenaed the fees and mileage pre-
scribed by law; to each examiner a reasonable sum for services and for travel; to persons
conveying the patient to the place of detention, disbursements for the travel, board, and lodging of
the patient and of themselves and their authorized assistants; and to the patient’s counsel, when
appointed by the court, a reasonable sum for travel and for the time spent in court or in preparing
for the hearing. Upon the court’s order, the county auditor shall issue a warrant on the county
treasurer for payment of the amounts allowed, excluding the costs of the examiner, which must be
paid by the state courts.”).
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impairment of functioning), and (3) have never received psychiatric treat-
ment for the disorder. The first and second of these requirements already
exist within the statutes of all fifty states and the District of Columbia.73
This standard hinges on the belief that individuals deserve, and in a
healthy state would want, an effective course of treatment for their mental
illness. The first-episode standard is intended to assist individuals and fami-
lies in times of crisis. The goal is to give individuals who are having their
first episode an opportunity to get healthy, so that they can reflect on their
first experience of mental illness and decide whether to pursue further treat-
ment.74 Having a severe episode and getting diagnosed are traumatic exper-
iences, and there is nothing that the law or any form of treatment can do to
prevent that. What first-episode involuntary treatment can do is get an indi-
vidual treatment early in the development of their mental illness, so that
they have the best chance to recover quickly, and are positioned for a posi-
tive long-term prognosis if they choose to pursue further treatment. After
the first-episode involuntary treatment comes to an end, the standard reverts
to the state’s existing standards for involuntary treatment.
I call this a first-episode standard, but the statutory construction would
more accurately be described as an initial-treatment standard. However, I
chose to call it a first-episode standard for three reasons. First, the problem
this standard seeks to address is primarily caused by the emergence of a
mental illness during a first episode. Second, clinicians are familiar with
first episodes and understand their importance in the course of a mental
illness. Third, by calling it a first-episode standard, its name reflects the
law’s already-episodic view of mental illness.
More important than the standard’s name is its elements, and with the
third I considered two different constructions. My first draft of the third
element was that the individual “is having a first episode” instead of “has
never received psychiatric treatment for the disorder.” I chose the latter be-
cause “first episode” is a clinical concept, and even though it would be
statutorily defined, it would ultimately require non-clinicians to make
clinical decisions. By simply requiring that the individual has not received
treatment, the statute uses plain language that is more easily understood by
everyone. In the end, this language should accomplish the same goal—help-
ing people get treatment at the emergence of their mental illness. However,
as written, the third requirement of the first-episode standard presents at
least three issues that are best illustrated by hypotheticals.
First, does a first-episode standard apply to a young woman who was
treated for anxiety or depression as a teenager and five years later has a
psychotic episode? This hypothetical presents the problem of how this stan-
73. See WINICK, supra note 3, at 75–78 (listing statutory definitions from all fifty states and
the District of Columbia).
74. See SAKS, supra note 9, at 59–60.
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dard will account for the former treatment of a different, less-severe mental
illness. The statute addresses this concern by specifying that the person has
never received treatment for the disorder. Under the statute, the disorder is
the one diminishing the person’s ability to reason, resulting in an impair-
ment of functioning. The natures of anxiety and depression are fundamen-
tally different from psychosis or mania. Dealing with anxiety or depression
will not likely prepare individuals or their loved ones to deal with a severe
psychotic or manic episode, especially if the prior treatment did not include
hospitalization. Since the purpose of the statute is to assist in such situa-
tions, and because the disorder causing the young woman’s episode is not
anxiety or depression, she meets the standard.
Second, does a first-episode standard apply to a man who has a major
manic episode and voluntarily seeks out treatment, but then, after recover-
ing, has a second major episode and does not seek out treatment? Here, the
issue is whether a first-episode involuntary treatment standard covers a per-
son dealing with a second episode of the same disorder. The standard is
meant to help families and individuals during an unprecedented crisis. Be-
cause this man has already had a manic episode, presumably was diagnosed
with bipolar disorder, and was treated, he and his loved ones should have
some idea of the challenges he faces and the resources that are available.
Under the statute, he already received treatment for the disorder diminish-
ing his ability to reason, resulting in an impairment of functioning. Conse-
quently, he would not meet the standard.
Third, does a first-episode standard apply to a woman who was invol-
untarily treated for her first manic episode and is diagnosed with bipolar
disorder, but then, years later, has what appears to be a psychotic episode
that is more typical of schizophrenia? The woman here is experiencing a
first episode of the disorder, however she has already received one course
of involuntary treatment for another disorder. The question is whether the
first-episode standard could ever be used twice for the same person if she is
experiencing an episode of a different disorder. The most important func-
tional purpose of the first-episode standard is to get individuals admitted to
an inpatient psychiatric hospital under an emergency hold. The woman
above already received inpatient treatment for her manic episode. As a re-
sult, she and her family are aware of inpatient treatment and hopefully were
educated on the legal standards one must meet for any further involuntary
treatment beyond the first episode. While the language of the first-episode
standard could be interpreted to allow for two courses of first-episode invol-
untary treatment for separate disorders, such a use is inconsistent with the
purposes of the statute. As a result she would not meet the first-episode
standard, nor would anyone who was previously hospitalized under it.
Also inherent in this statutory construction is the presumption that
there is a form of treatment for the disorder causing the episode. If there is
no psychiatric treatment for the disorder, then there is no way the third
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requirement could be met. The concept of medical appropriateness is built
into the standard.75 This language protects against the involuntary treatment
of people for whom available treatments will do no good. For example, all
hospitals with inpatient psychiatric units are equipped to treat psychotic,
manic, and major depressive episodes, so people likely to be diagnosed with
the treatable conditions of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or major depres-
sion can be put on emergency holds.76 However, if a hospital is not
equipped to treat an episode, then the individual should not be hospitalized.
For example, most hospitals would not be equipped to treat people who are
expressing the symptoms of antisocial personality disorder, kleptomania,
pyromania, or pathological gambling.77 All of these are psychiatric diagno-
ses, but they are not treatable in most hospital settings.78
To be workable, a first-episode standard must take into account the
people who would be using it and the environments in which it would be
used. While the standard is designed to benefit individuals having an epi-
sode, the primary users of the standard will be families, police officers,
emergency room staff, and courts. Almost all involuntary treatment begins
when police officers or family members bring an individual who is having
an episode to the emergency room.79 When police officers are called to help
an individual having an episode, they make an initial determination upon
encountering the individual as to whether the individual meets the state’s
legal standard for involuntary treatment.80 If the officers make a good faith
determination that the individual meets the standard, the police officers can
transport the individual to an emergency room.81 When an individual is
brought to the emergency room, hospital staff makes their own determina-
tion as to whether the individual meets the state’s legal standards for invol-
untary treatment.82 If the required staff within a hospital determines the
individual meets the involuntary treatment standard, then the individual can
75. See WINICK, supra note 3, at 52–59.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS OF MINNESOTA, UNDERSTANDING THE
MINNESOTA CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCESS 7–8 (2006), available at http://www.namihelps.org/
assets/PDFs/civil-commitmentSinglePg102108.pdf (providing an overview of one state’s civil
commitment process).
80. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 5122.10 (2012) “[A] police officer, or sheriff may take a
person into custody . . . and may immediately transport the parolee, [that person] . . . to a hospi-
tal . . . if . . . the police officer, or sheriff has reason to believe that the person is a mentally ill
person subject to hospitalization under court order . . . and represents a substantial risk of physical
harm to self or others . . . .”).
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., id. (“A person transported or transferred to a hospital . . . shall be examined by
the staff of the hospital . . . within twenty-four hours after arrival . . . [and] if the chief clinical
officer of the hospital . . . believes that the person is not a mentally ill person subject to hospitali-
zation by court order, the chief clinical officer shall release or discharge the person
immediately . . . .”).
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be placed on an emergency hold, usually lasting seventy-two hours. By the
end of that emergency hold, the hospital must either convince the individual
to become a voluntary patient, institute civil commitment proceedings, or
release the individual from the hospital.83 Usually patients become volun-
tary, are released during their emergency hold, or are released in the period
between the hold and the full commitment hearing, so the courtroom would
be the least common environment where this standard would be used.84
Regardless, the first-episode standard must be workable at every possible
step of its use, from transportation to the hospital, to the emergency room,
to the courtroom.
A. During First Episodes, Non-dangerous Individuals Should Be
Transported to the Hospital Without the Use of Force
Almost exclusively, either families or police officers bring mentally ill
people to hospitals for involuntary treatment.85 My family, as with most,
did this through a combination of pleading, ingenuity, bribery, threats, and
brute force. Unlike families, police officers are empowered by law to take
people into custody they believe meet the standard for involuntary treat-
ment.86 They can restrain and transport the individual against their
protestations.87
Police have an intimate, yet troubled relationship with mental illness.
Around 7% of police contacts involve individuals with mental illness,88 but
police “often feel inadequately trained to identify and intervene in cases
involving mental illness, yet when called to respond, they are responsible to
provide a disposition that both serves the needs of the individual and main-
tains order and safety in the community.”89
To address this problem, many states and municipalities have specially
trained mental health response teams, otherwise known as crisis interven-
tion teams (CITs).90 These teams vary widely in their composition, organi-
zation, policies, and procedures.91 They can be made up of police officers
83. See OHIO REV. CODE § 5122.11 (2012).
84. Statistics on this are hard to find, probably due to the unavailability of hospital data and
the diversity of holding periods of the many states, but this is common knowledge among practi-
tioners in the field and is stated plainly by Diane Greenley. See DIANE GREENLEY, Civil Commit-
ment and Voluntary Treatment, WISCONSIN COALITION FOR ADVOCACY 358, available at http://
drwi.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/civil-commitment-voluntary-treatment.PDF.
85. See NAMI, SCHIZOPHRENIA, supra note 66, at 3–4 (describing the various initiating
circumstances).
86. See OHIO REV. CODE § 5122.10 (2012).
87. See id.
88. See Randy Borum, Police Perspectives on Responding to Mentally Ill People in Crisis:
Perceptions of Program Effectiveness, 16 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 393, 393–405 (1998).
89. Id. at 394.
90. See, e.g., CIT CENTER, CIT National Directory, THE UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS, http://
cit.memphis.edu (providing a national directory of all the locations with CITs).
91. See Borum, supra note 88, at 395.
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and/or mental health professionals, but whatever their structure, they have
special training to deal with mental health crises. This type of specialized
response team would be vitally important to a first-episode standard.
When the police encounter individuals who meet the first-episode stan-
dard, by definition, these individuals would not present any physical danger
to themselves or others. This complicates the use of force, even the use of
handcuffs. Conceptually, it is hard to justify handcuffing someone who has
not committed a crime when there is no indication that the person’s hands,
left uncuffed, will cause any harm. Being handcuffed by the police is trau-
matic, and thus should be avoided in such situations. Where the individual
is not presenting a danger to himself or others, the use of force, in general,
should be avoided.
The proper police response to an individual’s first episode would need
to be further studied and discussed. There is the possibility that a first-epi-
sode standard and the police are largely incompatible. Ideally, a crisis inter-
vention team will exist in the jurisdiction where the individual is having a
first episode and, using their training, can either convince the individual to
get mental health treatment voluntarily or manage to get them to a hospital
without using physical force. Such a team could be called in by officers
already on the scene and 911 operators could be trained to inquire about the
possibility of mental health issues.
In my situation, when my father called the police, he was hopeful that
specially trained officers would respond. When young, untrained officers
arrived, he quickly shifted from asking for their help to convincing them to
leave. He knew their presence could cause more harm than good. In such
situations, when untrained officers respond and they see no physical danger,
maybe it is enough if they inform the individual and other people present of
the first-episode standard for involuntary treatment, but that the officers will
not use force to transport a non-dangerous individual to the hospital.
B. The First-Episode Standard Is Easily Applied in the Emergency
Room
When family or police officers bring an individual to the emergency
room, the hospital staff will do their own assessment of whether the individ-
ual meets the first-episode standard and consequently qualifies for an emer-
gency hold. Hospital staffs are well suited for this task. A first episode is
much more connected to medical diagnoses than physical harm standards,
so it should be more workable for clinicians.
Upon arrival at the hospital, the individual will go through the regular
assessment process that usually includes a clinical interview and blood tests
to see if the episode is drug induced.92 The clinicians will usually speak
92. The information in this paragraph came from an interview on June 15, 2012 with George
V. Babolia, the Director of Social Work Services at the University of St. Thomas Interprofessional
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with the police or family who brought the individual in for treatment. They
may also contact other family of the individual if they are able and it is
appropriate. On the basis of the information they gather, clinicians will de-
termine whether the individual is experiencing an episode of a treatable
mental illness and whether it has ever been treated before. If they determine
it is the individual’s first episode, then they could place the individual on an
emergency hold if they think it would be therapeutic to the individual.
Prior to placing individuals on emergency holds, hospital staff should
make every effort to explain the situation to individuals and encourage them
to voluntarily admit themselves. Voluntary admissions are preferable to in-
voluntary admissions for a number of reasons: they avoid compulsion, the
patient receives more rights in the hospital, and evidence has shown that
“willing patients are better patients; they are more cooperative, more moti-
vated to get better, and more successfully treated.”93 For all first-episode
patients, hospitals should provide them and their families with a general
education about their mental illness and possible treatments.
C. Current Involuntary Treatment Legal Procedures Can Easily Adapt
to First-Episode Standards
While on an emergency hold, if the hospital or the individual’s family
members believe the individual would benefit from further treatment and
the individual is unwilling to become a voluntary patient, then the hospital
or family could petition the court for extended court-ordered treatment.
Introducing a new standard for involuntary treatment will only require
one significant change to the legal process currently in place in most states.
Respondents will still be given notice, appointed counsel, have the right to
cross examine witnesses and present evidence, and be entitled to full hear-
ings.94 While the petitioner will need to prove the respondent meets the
first-episode standard and not a physical harm standard, the petitioner will
still need to prove it by clear and convincing evidence.95 Courts considering
first-episode cases should still consider the medical appropriateness of hos-
pitalization and whether there is a less restrictive alternative available.96 In
states with court-ordered outpatient treatment programs, such alternatives to
hospitalization should be considered.
The one substantive change to current legal procedure would be the
process for termination of the involuntary treatment. Most state statutes cur-
rently provide for a ninety-day initial commitment. In practice, most com-
mitments do not last the full ninety days. One survey showed that 61.5% of
Center, and a clinical social worker who does assessments in a Minnesota emergency room for
involuntary hospitalizations.
93. SAKS, supra note 9, at 62.
94. See WINICK, supra note 3, at 141–42.
95. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
96. See WINICK, supra note 3, at 69–72.
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patients were discharged after spending thirty days or less in the hospital
and another 20.7% of patients were discharged between thirty-one and sixty
days.97 This indicates that most civilly committed patients are discharged
by the hospital long before their ninety-day court-ordered commitment
ends. Institutions that care for the civilly committed have the power to dis-
charge patients to a less restrictive setting when the patients have stabi-
lized.98 Patients who still pose some form of physical harm will rarely be
released to a less restrictive setting, and may be eligible for an extension of
their ninety-day commitment by court order.99 Hospitals and courts con-
sider both the risk of physical harm and the treatment needs of a patient
before releasing her. The physical harm element is a necessary element of
that decision, and that element is not part of the first-episode standard. As a
result, the first-episode standard needs its own method for determining
when it is appropriate to release a patient committed under the first-episode
standard.
The proper time to end the involuntary treatment of first-episode pa-
tients must “‘bear some reasonable relation’ to the espoused purpose of
commitment.”100 The purpose of first-episode involuntary treatment is to
treat the acute first episode so the individual can make choices about their
continued treatment in a healthier state of mind.101 This leaves two logical
options for the termination of first-episode involuntary treatment. Either the
individual is discharged when the first episode has been successfully treated
and they are able to make decisions about their future treatment with a
healthy state of mind, or a hard deadline is set on the length of first-episode
involuntary treatments based on the length of time it usually takes for pa-
tients to respond to treatment after a first episode.
The first option mirrors physical harm standards more closely—an in-
dividual is hospitalized because X; therefore, when X is resolved, the indi-
vidual should be released. This approach is treatment-oriented and flexible
enough to meet the needs of a wide range of individual experiences. How-
ever, some episodes may be treatment adverse, making it difficult to find an
effective treatment in a short period of time, if there are effective treatments
at all. In those worst case scenarios, courts would be put in the awkward
position of deciding when to discontinue ongoing treatment efforts because
97. See id. at 2–3 n. 9.
98. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 5122.15(F) (2012) (“If, at any time prior to the expiration of
the ninety-day period, it is determined by the hospital . . . that the respondent’s treatment needs
could be equally well met in an available and appropriate less restrictive environment . . . (1) The
respondent shall be released from the care of the hospital . . . ; and (2) [the hospital] . . . shall place
the respondent in the least restrictive environment . . . .”).
99. See id. § 5122.15(H).
100. Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary Confine-
ment of Sexually Violent Predators, 35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 338 (2003) (quoting Jackson v. Indi-
ana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).
101. See supra Part III.
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the hospitalization does not appear to be medically appropriate. Without
court intervention, the treatment efforts could continue indefinitely.
That concern would be addressed by the second option—a hard dead-
line based on the usual amount of time it takes to stabilize a severely men-
tally ill patient. Research indicates that psychotic episodes, the most severe
type of episodes, have the greatest response rate to anti-psychotic medica-
tion within the first three weeks of treatment.102 Nonetheless, extended
treatment—especially up to six weeks—continues to produce clinically sig-
nificant improvements.103 Since the most affected individuals should be rel-
atively stable within six weeks and the general goal is to allow the
individual to make decisions about future treatment in a healthy state of
mind, then a time-limited first-episode standard lasting no longer than sixty
days would be enough to restore most everyone experiencing a first episode
to a healthier state of mind. The standard could have a sixty-day minimum
involuntary treatment period, with most individuals requiring much less
time in the hospital.
These two approaches to ending first-episode involuntary treatment are
compatible and could be used in tandem. A state could allow for involun-
tary treatment up until the point of stabilization or a hard deadline, which-
ever comes first. Determining the hard deadline for a first-episode
commitment is a serious policy choice that should be based on more scien-
tific evidence than is presented here. It may also require the weighing of
non-scientific factors raised by interested groups representing families and
patients. But given the goals of the first-episode standard, the most impor-
tant factor for states to consider is how long it will take to restore patients to
a healthier state of mind so they can make decisions about their future
treatment.
D. Legislatures Adopting First-Episode Standards Should Include
Findings of Fact
Before a first-episode standard ever makes it into the field, it would
need to pass through a state legislature. Legislatures drafting these stan-
dards should include substantial legislative findings of fact for the sake of
both legal practitioners and people with mental illness. Being that the laws
would be unprecedented, legal actors would benefit from understanding the
evidence they are based upon and what purposes the laws seek to achieve.
As a result, legislative findings of fact should touch upon the unique indi-
vidual, social, medical, and political problems and opportunities presented
by first episodes, and point to them as the reasons for the adoption of the
laws.
102. Takefumi Suzuki et al., Time Course of Improvement with Antipsychotic Medication in
Treatment-Resistant Schizophrenia, 199 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 275, 275–79 (2011).
103. Id.
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Not only would this be helpful to judges and lawyers, it would also be
helpful to patients. A first-episode standard, as a law, has therapeutic poten-
tial within itself. “Legal rules, legal practices, and the way legal actors . . .
play their roles impose consequences on the mental health and emotional
well-being of those affected.”104 People who are involuntarily hospitalized
are usually given a description of their rights by the hospital. This pamphlet
usually includes the legal standard for commitment. For individuals hospi-
talized under a first-episode standard, the pamphlet could include not only
the legal definition of a first episode, but also the reasons the legislature
adopted a law allowing for involuntary treatment during first episodes.
Reading the reasons why they are being involuntarily treated could further
expand the ability of first-time patients to gain insight into their illnesses.
IV. THE CONCERNS RAISED BY A FIRST-EPISODE STANDARD ARE
LEGITIMATE, BUT ARE OUTWEIGHED BY ITS POTENTIAL BENEFITS
There are many questions about a first-episode standard that this paper
does not address, but there are two urgent concerns that need to be ad-
dressed. First, would a first-episode standard be therapeutic? And second, is
a first-episode standard constitutional?
A. Would a First-Episode Standard be Therapeutic?
Any form of involuntary treatment involves compulsion.105 Individuals
resistant to treatment are compelled to accept it. Given the mental state of
the individuals, it is not clear whether this compulsion is against their
will,106 but it is certainly against their protestations. For obvious reasons,
scholars and clinicians have questioned whether compulsory treatment is
therapeutic.107 Thus far, their questions have not been conclusively an-
swered, and the challenges of unraveling the myriad of variables that could
measure compulsion and therapeutic success combined with the ever-
changing landscape of mental health treatments make it unlikely that a de-
finitive answer will soon emerge.108
There is evidence that voluntary patients have better outcomes than
involuntary patients.109 But to study the ultimate therapeutic effectiveness
of involuntary treatment, one would have to compare the outcomes of peo-
104. WINICK, supra note 3, at 6.
105. I use the term “compulsion” rather than “coercion,” which is often used elsewhere, be-
cause coercion involves using force or threats and often carries a negative connotation. “Compul-
sion” carries a less negative connotation, involuntary treatment is legal after all, and it describes
the state of being forced to do something and not the means through which it is done. The means
in this case are not as simple as coercion would imply.
106. See Herschel Hardin, Uncivil Liberties, VANCOUVER SUN, July 22, 1993, available at
http://www.northshoreschizophrenia.org/Uncivil_Liberties.htm.
107. WINICK, supra note 3, at 23–24
108. Id.
109. SAKS, supra note 9, at 62.
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ple who received it versus those who never receive treatment. Such studies
raise ethical and practical problems that have been difficult to overcome.
With a paucity of information about the therapeutic value of compulsory
treatment in general, the therapeutic foundation for a first-episode standard
rests on clinical theories and the experiences of people who have already
been through involuntary treatment under other standards.
Elyn R. Saks says the first-episode standard gives an individual the
chance to actualize a psychiatrist’s fantasies.110 Alan Stone dubbed this the
“thank you” theory of civil commitment, “he will be treated, with treatment
he will recover, and on recovery he will be immensely grateful to the thera-
pist.”111 Needless to say, this does not always happen. Many times upon
release, individuals go off their medications and wind up back in the hospi-
tal a few months later, in a common phenomenon known as the revolving
door syndrome.112 However, the “thank you” theory is also based in reality.
Individuals often do recover and are grateful they were compelled to re-
ceive treatment when they needed it most. I am an example of that, but I am
not alone. A number of different studies have surveyed former involuntary
patients to learn their present feelings about their past treatment. The stud-
ies vary widely in design, but across the board, substantial numbers of indi-
viduals, usually around 50%, had positive things to say about involuntary
treatment—especially when asked if the treatment was effective.113 Treat-
ment can and does help most people who receive it—whether they get it
involuntarily or voluntarily.
B. Is a First-Episode Standard Constitutional?
Because a first-episode standard does not currently exist, its constitu-
tionality has not been considered by the Supreme Court. If it were to go
before the Court, it is likely the main question the Court would answer is
whether a first-episode involuntary treatment violates substantive due pro-
cess. Most likely, the answer would be no.
110. Id. at 59.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Gustavo Fernandez & Sylvia Nygard, Impact of Involuntary Outpatient Com-
mitment on the Revolving-Door Syndrome in North Carolina, 41 HOSP. & CMTY. PSYCHIATRY
1001, 1001–04 (1990).
113. See TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, The Effects of Involuntary Commitment and Invol-
untary Medication on Individuals with Serious Mental Illnesses – Backgrounder (Mar. 2011),
www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/resources/briefing-papers-and-fact-sheets/159/467.
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1. The Legal Landscape of Involuntary Treatment Has Been
Continually Shifting Over the Past Fifty Years
Over the course of his life, Bruce J. Ennis appeared as counsel in 250
cases before the Supreme Court.114 The first client he represented before the
Court was Kenneth Donaldson. In 1957, Donaldson was civilly committed
to a Florida State Hospital because his family thought he was having delu-
sions. During the next fifteen years, Donaldson often requested release,
pointing to the facts that he was not dangerous, he was not being given
treatment, and he had a support system willing to help him live safely in the
community, but his requests were denied. When Ennis heard Donaldson’s
story, he was outraged. Ennis was the director of the Mental Illness Litiga-
tion Project of the American Civil Liberties Union and, before reaching the
Supreme Court, he published Donaldson’s story in Prisoners of Psychiatry.
Donaldson’s story was one of four that Ennis used to illustrate the
[E]normous disparity between what mental hospitals are supposed
to be and what they really are. They are supposed to be places
where troubled people receive care and attention from a gentle
and dedicated staff. They are, instead, places where sick people
get sicker and sane people go mad, where the hours are filled not
with compassion, but with neglect.115
With these conditions in mind, Ennis’s goal was “nothing less than the abo-
lition of involuntary hospitalization.”116 Ennis and his contemporaries pur-
sued that goal with fervor.
Believing commitment to do more harm than good, Ennis and other
civil liberties lawyers advocated for strict commitment standards. In 1969,
before a U.S. Senate subcommittee, Ennis testified: “Commitment because
of alleged danger to self or to others should require proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt, based on a recent overt act or threat, that the person would, if at
liberty, inflict substantial physical injury upon himself or others within the
immediate future.”117 This was a popular standard throughout the legal
community and Milwaukee Legal Services fought for it in a class action
that hoped to completely overhaul Wisconsin’s mental health delivery
system.118
114. Wolfgang Saxon, Bruce J. Ennis, 60, Lawyer Who Fought for Civil Liberties, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2000, http;//www.nytimes.com/2000/08/02/us/bruce-j-ennis-60-lawyer-who-
fought-for-civil-liberties.html.
115. BRUCE J. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY: MENTAL PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRISTS, AND
THE LAW 81–82 (1972).
116. Id. at 232.
117. TORREY, supra note 58, at 78.
118. Id.
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In Lessard v. Schmidt,119 the United States District Court of Wisconsin
set “the high water mark for involuntary commitment law.”120 The protec-
tions it describes for individuals facing involuntary treatment were the fur-
thest reaching during that era of reform.121 In commitment proceedings, the
district court held that the proper standard of proof for determining mental
illness and dangerousness was beyond a reasonable doubt (now it is clear
and convincing).122 To impose involuntary treatment “the state must bear
the burden of proving that there is an extreme likelihood that if the person is
not confined he will do immediate harm to himself or others.”123 While
recognizing that future predictions are suspect, the court “believe[d] civil
confinement can be justified in some cases if the proper burden of proof is
satisfied and dangerousness is based upon a finding of a recent overt act,
attempt or threat to do substantial harm to oneself or another.”124 Lessard
was never appealed to the Supreme Court, but most states adjusted their
involuntary treatment laws to adopt parts of the Lessard decision.125
In 1972, when Lessard was decided, the dangerousness standard was
novel. Washington, D.C. was the first jurisdiction in 1964 to pass involun-
tary treatment laws requiring dangerousness as a factor for involuntary
treatment, but in the wake of Lessard most states followed by the end of the
1970s.126
In the hundred years prior to the 1970s, dangerousness was not re-
quired for involuntary treatment. States allowed for the civil commitment of
individuals on the finding that they had a need for treatment.127 By the start
of the Civil War in 1860 civil “commitments were predicated only on a
mentally ill person requiring care, and state-run asylums were assumed to
be the best places to care for such people.”128 Today, those asylums are
largely dismantled and there are no signs of our mental health delivery sys-
tem returning to a state-managed affair.
As can be seen from cases like Donaldson, much of the civil commit-
ment reforms of the 1970s were in response to the abuses resulting from the
intertwined realities of treatment-oriented legal standards and state-run in-
stitutions. With the state-run institutions dismantled, the strict commitment
119. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wisc. 1972).
120. TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, Lessard v. Schmidt (2011) (internal memorandum),
available at http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/component/content/article/344.
121. Id.
122. Lessard, 349 F.Supp. at 1095.
123. Id. at 1093.
124. Id.
125. See TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, supra note 120, at “Significance”.
126. Stuart A. Anfang & Paul S. Appelbaum, Civil Commitment—The American Experience,
43 ISR. J. PSYCHIATRY RELAT. SCI. 209, 211–18 (2006).
127. Id. at 210.
128. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\10-2\UST205.txt unknown Seq: 28  8-JAN-14 14:19
496 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:2
standards states adopted in the wake of Lessard are loosening.129 Parens
patriae legal standards for involuntary treatment have been slowly ex-
panding. So far, there has not been a return to the abuses of old. With strin-
gent due process protections in place and powerful state institutions gone,
the traditional value of getting treatment to mentally ill people seems to be
safely re-emerging. Thus far, the broader standards of grave disability, need
for medical treatment, or damage to property “have either been upheld in
court as constitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or have yet to be challenged.”130 The same Supreme Court
decisions under which these recent expansions of involuntary treatment
have been upheld would also permit the adoption of a first-episode
standard.
2. The Supreme Court Has Not Wholly Addressed the Substantive
Due Process of Parens Patriae Involuntary Treatment
The Supreme Court’s involuntary treatment substantive due process
jurisprudence has followed a rather simple equation.131 “As a threshold
matter, due process limits the purposes that a state can seek to promote
through the auspices of civil commitment. In turn, the nature or conditions
and duration of commitment must ‘[a]t the least . . . bear some reasonable
relation’ to the espoused purpose of the commitment.”132
The first-episode standard, as conceptualized here, should only raise
concerns about the State’s purposes, since the nature of the treatment and its
duration have already been addressed.133 The legitimate purposes for the
State’s exercise of parens patriae power to involuntarily treat an individual
were discussed in the seminal case of O’Connor v. Donaldson, with Ennis
representing Donaldson.134 In that case, the question was whether an indi-
vidual who is harmless, has support to live safely in the community, and is
not receiving treatment can be indefinitely confined by the state on a mere
finding that he is mentally ill.135 The Court’s answer:
The Jury found that Donaldson was neither dangerous to himself
nor dangerous to others, and also found that, if mentally ill, Don-
aldson had not received treatment. That verdict, based on abun-
dant evidence, makes the issue before the Court a narrow one. We
129. Even in Wisconsin, where Lessard was decided, the commitment standard has relaxed
from “immediate harm to self or others” to “substantial probability of physical harm” and “recent
acts or omissions that, due to mental illness, he or she is unable to satisfy basic needs for nourish-
ment, medical care, shelter or safety without prompt adequate treatment.” WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(1)(a)2 (2012).
130. Pfeffer, supra note 21, at 289–93.
131. Janus & Logan, supra note 100, at 338.
132. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).
133. See supra Section III(C).
134. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
135. Id. at 574–75.
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need not decide whether, when, or by what procedures, a mentally
ill person may be confined by the State on any of the grounds
which, under contemporary statutes, are generally advanced to
justify involuntary confinement of such a person – to prevent in-
jury to the public, to ensure his own survival or safety, or to alle-
viate or cure his illness . . . For the jury found that none of the
above grounds for continued confinement was present in Donald-
son’s case.
Given the jury’s findings, what was left as justification for keeping Donald-
son in continued confinement?136
At that point, the dicta and confusion begins. In its search for some
justification for Donaldson’s confinement, the Court dances around the
three actual purposes generally advanced by the fifty states for involuntary
treatment—“[1] to prevent injury to the public, [2] to ensure his own sur-
vival or safety, or [3] to alleviate or cure his illness”—but the court never
discusses them directly.137 It never explains what constitutes an injury to
the public or what is meant by “ensur[ing] his own survival or safety.”138
The court uses the buzzwords of injury, harm, safety, and danger through-
out without ever discussing what they mean. Instead of addressing the
State’s purpose of alleviating or curing illnesses, the Court states that
“[t]here is no reason now to decide . . . whether the State may compulsorily
confine a non-dangerous, mentally ill individual for the purpose of
treatment.”139
Instead of addressing those questions, the Court opts to ask such ques-
tions as “[m]ay the State confine the mentally ill merely to ensure them a
living standard superior to that they enjoy in the private community?”140
And, “[m]ay the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its
citizens from the exposure to those whose ways are different?”141
The questions the Court asked and those it did not reveal the Court’s
concerns. It was not so much concerned with the stated justifications of the
fifty states as with their unstated ones—to give the mentally ill a suppos-
edly better living standard and to keep them out of sight. Through Bruce
Ennis and his colleagues’ tireless advocacy, those illegitimate purposes
were largely snuffed out. Since then, the Court has not revisited the three
traditional purposes of the State in compelling involuntary treatment. The
concepts of harm and treatment have never been deeply explored on their
own terms. Such a discussion would be incredibly helpful in the creation of
a first-episode standard, and so I’ve begun it here.
136. Id. at 573–74 (emphasis added).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 573.
140. Id. at 575.
141. Id.
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3. The Generally Advanced State Purposes of Preventing Harm
and Alleviating Illness Support the Use of First-Episode
Standards
Thus far, expansions of parens patriae involuntary treatment have
been tied to physical harm, but the first-episode standard involves a differ-
ent view of harm. First episodes can be harmful to individuals even at the
point when physical harm has not developed. Individuals who are having
first episodes lack insight to a greater degree than people already with
chronic conditions.142 This leaves them, and their families, more vulnerable
to their illnesses. Before reaching a point of physical harm, individuals’
lives can unravel as a result of their episodes. Education, employment, and
relationships become very difficult,143 which inevitably can lead to drop-
outs, job-loss, and isolation. The longer episodes go untreated, their effects
continue to snowball and can lead to arrests or homelessness144—which
dangerousness standards often only address after the harm is done. From a
medical standpoint, intervening early and effectively gives individuals the
best chance of having a long-term healthy prognosis.145 A healthy progno-
sis means fewer episodes.146 Fewer repeated episodes of psychosis lead to
better long-term health, whereas repeated episodes may cause permanent
damage to the brain or a “kindling” effect for mood disorders.147
This view of harm is not precluded by the Supreme Court in O’Connor
v. Donaldson. The decision uses the terms harm, injury, safety, and danger,
but nowhere does it limit those concepts by physicality. Webster’s defini-
tions are also not physically limited. For example, “harm” means “physical
or mental damage”148 and “danger” means “exposure or liability to injury,
pain, harm, or loss.”149 The Donaldson decision does not discuss the nature
of harm or danger because that was not the Court’s concern. The Court was
concerned with improper uses of civil commitment, and civil commitment
for the purpose of preventing harm—tangible or intangible—was not
among the class of improper State purposes that the Court identified.
The State’s purpose to alleviate illnesses would also support the use of
a first-episode standard. The first-episode standard is limited to situations
where treatments exist, and the period of compulsion only lasts as long as
necessary for treatments to take effect, and even then could have definite
time limitations. Treating mental illnesses at their early onset gives individ-
142. See supra Section II(B).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary (the pri-
mary definition is “physical or mental damage”).
149. Id.
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uals the best chance of quickly achieving stability and maintaining it in the
long run.150  Treatment is needed for almost every episode, but the crisis is
most acute during the first episode, and the benefits of treatment are never
greater.
4. People Experiencing First Episodes Do Not Need Individual
Competency Determinations
At the heart of the legal debate on involuntary treatment is the tension
between honoring a mentally ill person’s desire not to be treated and the
community’s belief that the individual would benefit from treatment. These
values are hard to reconcile and their champions often come from different
camps. Courts and legal scholars commonly look upon involuntary hospi-
talizations as a “massive curtailment of liberty.”151 For those who have not
witnessed a mentally ill person in the midst of a serious episode, this is a
natural observation; but for those who have, the liberty interest at stake
takes on a different meaning. Herschel Hardin, a Canadian author, commen-
tator, and father of a schizophrenic child, argued in an article, Uncivil Lib-
erties, that “[t]he opposition to involuntary committal and treatment betrays
a profound misunderstanding of the principle of civil liberties. Medication
can free victims from their illness—free them from the Bastille of their
psychoses—and restore their dignity, their free will and the meaningful ex-
ercise of their liberties.”152 Hardin twists the accepted view of involuntary
treatment on its head—instead of being a curtailment of liberty, it is a great
liberating force. His view is not widely held, but it exposes the complexities
that mental illness introduces to the civil liberties arena.
One concept Hardin struggles with is something scholars and courts
have struggled with as well—the autonomy of the mentally ill. This paper
would be incomplete without a discussion of competency. Some states’ in-
voluntary commitment standards explicitly include determinations of com-
petency, while others do not.153 The first-episode standard does not require
individual competency determinations.
In Donaldson, the Court stated that “[a] finding of ‘mental illness’
alone cannot justify a State’s locking a person up against his will and keep-
ing him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement.”154 The first-episode
standard would involuntarily confine a person based on a finding of mental
illness alone, but it would be a time-limited commitment, even shorter than
existing civil commitments. In his concurrence, Chief Justice Burger, stated
that “[a]t a minimum, a particular scheme for protection of the mentally ill
must rest upon a legislative determination that it is compatible with the best
150. See supra Section II(B).
151. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
152. Hardin, supra note 106.
153. WINICK, supra note 3, at 99.
154. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
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interests of the affected class and that its members are unable to act for
themselves.”155 To enact first-episode standards, legislatures would need to
make such a determination.
The best analogy to the first-episode standard’s approach to compe-
tency is the Supreme Court’s treatment of the admission of minors to psy-
chiatric hospitals. I worry this analogy may be offensive—to liken adults to
children—but the first psychotic or manic episode does place individuals in
a position where they are dependent on others for care, and unlike future
episodes, they have much less experience managing that state of mind on
their own.
In almost every state, minors can be voluntarily admitted to psychiatric
hospitals upon their parents’ application, even if the child protests.156 The
Supreme Court “has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents
to act in the best interests of their children.”157 Since “most children, even
in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning
many decisions, including their need for medical care or treatment,” the
Court recognizes that parents “can and must” make those decisions.158
Where natural parents are not present, and children are wards of the State,
the Court does not require different admissions procedures as long as the
State is required to act in the best interests of the child.159 The Court pro-
tects children from arbitrary commitments by their parents or the State by
requiring that “the admissions staffs of the hospitals have acted in a neutral
and detached fashion in making medical judgments in the best interests of
the children.”160
The first-episode standard adopts this approach to competency. People
experiencing first episodes are not necessarily presumed to be incompetent,
but they are presumed, as a class, to be less capable of making decisions in
their best interests than their families, state actors, and medical profession-
als.161 As a result, it is not necessary for hospital staff or courts to make
individual competency decisions when utilizing a first-episode standard.
155. Id. at 583.
156. These laws were found to be constitutional in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 620–21
(1979).
157. Id. at 602–03.
158. Id. at 603.
159. Id. at 618–19.
160. Id. at 616.
161. Eric S. Janus suggested that I consider an emergency guardianship rather than, or in
addition to, a first episode commitment. The idea being that parents can voluntarily apply for the
admission of their adult child, resulting in a voluntary admission under which the family would
have more power and access to information. I am fascinated by this idea and think it may even be
preferential in some cases to the first episode standard I propose. The main challenge I faced is its
legal construction. While it is most likely possible, it is a topic for another paper, not necessarily
written by me.
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CONCLUSION
The law and mental illness are an odd couple. One makes rules, the
other breaks them. One demands adherence, the other demands accommo-
dations. One relies on reason, the other defies it. With such different na-
tures, it is no wonder that the law and mental illness have never quite
clicked. Their incompatibility is of no consequence, however. Theirs is a
marriage of necessity. They are inextricably part of human existence.  As
long as there are people, some will be mentally ill, and all will be subject to
laws.  So there is no escaping the task before us. We, the makers of laws
and the carriers of illnesses, must find a way for these human accessories to
fit together.
A first-episode standard is an attempt to make the law more responsive
to the realities faced by people impacted by mental illness by creating a
streamlined pathway to treatment during the critical moment of an individ-
ual’s first episode. A first-episode standard rests upon the belief that mental
health treatment is something that most people in a healthy state would
want were they to envision themselves having a serious episode of a mental
illness. A first-episode standard attempts to assist families in crises and po-
sition individuals, as much as possible, to live healthy lives with a mental
illness. A first-episode standard recognizes that the most significant harm
often caused by first episodes is intangible.
This paper leaves many questions unanswered. While it advocates for
the eventual passage of first-episode laws, many steps must be taken be-
forehand. A deeper discussion of many aspects of this paper is warranted,
particularly on the interaction between police and those having first epi-
sodes and the proper time to end a first-episode commitment. Further study
of the therapeutic value of involuntary treatment would be illuminating, as
would an analysis of any costs associated with a first-episode standard. Fi-
nally, this standard would affect many stakeholders and all of them should
be heard. Politicians, social workers, medical professionals, advocacy
groups, lawyers, families, and people with mental illnesses all have a stake
in this.
A first-episode standard is an exception to the general rules requiring
physical harm; but, as an exception, it is intended for exceptional circum-
stances. First episodes are turning points in individuals’ lives, and the law,
whether passively or actively, will always play some role in the direction
that an individual winds up following. A first-episode standard encourages
individuals along a path generally valued by the community. Not some
amorphous community, but individuals’ friends and families, who want
their loved ones to get treatment so that they will flourish and stay con-
nected to those who love them. The law, during first episodes, should stand
on the side of that love.
